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Foreword
The study of fault tolerant computing takes the origins from the past as a separate 
assessed discipline from the aerospace industry: the first book on the subject dates 
1965 [PIER65]; from these pionieristic age, the research has proposed various 
models and techniques to validate and successfully design fault-tolerant systems 
focusing on their behavior in presence of malfunctioning induced by hardware 
components; in order to provide continuation of service or fail-safe operation such 
techniques try to indentify the origin of faults and the palliative operation to 
guarantee the design specifications [JOHN89].
As the research has progressed in defining new fault tolerant topologies, the 
reliability of components has improved over the years leaving even less 
responsibility to the hardware design, because most of the causes of a system 
malfunctioning may arise from a software problem, which is of different orders of 
magnitude more complex than hardware and thence very difficult to validate with 
formal methods [RAND75]. The problem emerged as a consequence of a common 
trend to replace hardware functionalities by firmware [0SB078] started in 1971 with 
the introduction of the first general purpose microprocessor chip [ASPR97]: most of 
nowadays control systems performing critical operations rely their functionality on 
the massive usage of embedded software [BRIE93 ESCH97 LION96 VOAS97a 
YEH97].
Although what is or is not a "critical system" is often debated, a critical software 
system is simply a system, where failure, denial of service and so forth could have 
expensive consequences, such as loss of life, a loss of business, lost property or 
financial interests [VOAS98b].
The result is that the traditional definition of "fault-tolerance", typical of electrical 
and computer engineering, which refers to building subsystems from redundant 
components, is inappropriate when applied to systems performing most of their 
functionalities in software. Many authoritative fonts have pointed out that software 
errors are consequence of a lack in specifications [S IW I98]: indeed, considering 
negligible the occorrence of errors in the "manufacturing" process, the software is 
subject only to design errors, or to misunderstandings of such formal specifications; 
consequently, more than 50 statistical models have been developed for the 
estimation of software reliability over the past 20 years [PHAM 95], but 
comparatively a very little contribution has been given in the techniques for 
achieving software fault tolerance [LITT91].
The formalization of software fault tolerance is a matter of recent years [MARC94]: a 
computer program is considered failure-tolerant, if and only if [VOAS97a]:
A  Smart Voting Subsystem for Distributed Fault Tolerance 3
1. is able to compute an acceptable result, even if the program itself 
suffers from incorrect logic;
2. whenever correct or incorrect, it is able to perform a safe computation, 
even if the program itself receives corrupted or malicious data during 
execution.
where the concept of safe computation reflects the incidental damages, which can 
occur to the whole embedded system (hardware and software) as consequence of a 
software failure.
The last frontier of the research on software dependability is to employ for design 
commercial off-the-shelf components (COTS) in place of custom embedded systems, 
with immediate benefits in terms of reduced developement times, availability and 
maturity of many commercial tools and operating systems [Iyer, 1999 #238].
Although this last aspect of dependable software environments is still at an 
embrional stage, we can distinguist three main guidelines followed over the years:
© Direct design of failure tolerant software [VOAS97c] running on the top of fault- 
tolerant operating systems; such systems rely on specialized hardwares to provide a 
dependable framework, which includes as native features replicated execution 
[BORG89], reliable group communication, checkpointing and roll-back recovery.
© A  separate fault tolerant engine, which implements in software the basic building 
blocks to provide extra dependability to applications: the services are accessible in a 
separate process or thread through an interface libray, which maps the calls a 
proprietary API. These dependable libraries provide high-availability networking 
services and supply algorithms to identify (and recover) from a dead node. Piranya is 
a superset of the CORBA environment, which implements dependable 
functionalities [MAFF97], while Wolfpack [MS97] is an extension of the Microsoft 
NT Server cluster architecture. RAS is the clustering architecture proposed by Sun 
Microsystems [SUN97].
(D A  total networked environment, which provides fault tolerant services to the 
application standing on the top, without mandatory request for running on 
specialized hardware. In order to exibit a failure-tolerant behavior, some 
environments require a slight modification of the application source code [CUKI98], 
some others provide the fail-safe functionalities free of charge and at a price of less 
flexibility, because they put strict requirements on the end-user application, they 
implement a limited set of built-in redundant execution polices.
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Chameleon [W HIS98] is a software infrastructure, that standing between the last 
two solutions is aimed to integrate operating system features and to provide at 
system level high prerequisites for failure tolerant execution. It is the research 
response, like other experimental architectures [CUKI98], to commercial systems, 
which still do not fit to networks with a large number of nodes.
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Introduction
Chameleon is an adaptive software infrastructure, which allows different levels of 
availability to be supported simultaneously in a networked environment; its 
leitmotiv is to protect a distributed application running over a network by the 
definition of additional fault tolerance polices, which cannot be covered by 
conventional hardware fault tolerance techniques.
This paper describes our proposal for an adaptive voting system, which integrates 
other recovery strategies still existing in Chameleon by providing a set of services 
aimed to collect and to match data produced by the ARMOR architecture or available 
externally from multiple replicas of a client application; our design involves three 
main areas, which strictly depend one each other, as we will explain in this report:
1 - Application Program Interface (API)
2 - Smart voting system design & implementation
3 - Chameleon Messsage Dispatching
The Chameleon interface AP I has been extended with the intending to allow an easy 
porting of existing applications written in ANSI C to assimilate the environment 
fault tolerant layer with slight patches to the original source code; this objective 
forced the creation of an interface following standard C library conventions and 
using no special C++ features or inheritance, but function wrappers compliant to 
ANSI C. These aspects are presented in the following section of this paper.
We observe that because this extension impacts only the interface API, it w ill not 
prevent at a same future to expand the Chameleon ARM OR architecture with a C++ 
interface library from which safety requirements could be inherited as multiple 
properties of basic building blocks; however, we feel that this is a long time goal, 
which will be worth as applications will be designed having Chameleon as target 
environment, i.e. making the application a resilient ARMOR of the environment. 
Actually, our main concern is to set a flexible design philosophy for porting existing 
sofware under Chameleon.
The central part of this paper covers the design issues of the smart voting system, 
which is composed by a set of ARM OR elements, whose responsibility is to assemble 
data from the periphery through the Fault Tolerance Manager (FTM) node, where 
stands the centralized voter ARMOR. The communication among the various 
objects, which make the voting subsystem is hierarchical and makes use of an 
asymmetric signature generation to minimize the exchanged data-flow, which is 
handled asynchronously with the outputs rising the application front-end.
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Another important aspect described in the last section is related to Chameleon 
message dispatching system: we introduced the concept of dynamic messages leaving 
an addressing space available for their registration; such messages will exist for the 
duration of specific services and will allow a very fast and reliable reconfiguration of 
the environment releasing the overhead on some centralized managers.
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1 - Chameleon Application Interface (API) In developing the program interface, we 
posed from the end-user developer perspective, who wants to modify a complex 
application designed with no reliability requirements to run it under Chameleon, in 
order to benefit of the safety services provided by the fault tolerance layer. Believing 
that the effectiveness of an Application Program Interface for such external 
environment, as Chameleon is intended to be at this early stage, stands in its 
simplicity, we put a great effort in designing an interface that fits transparently on 
the top of the original application concentrating all the extra information required by 
the fault tolerance layer in some global properties, which must appear at the very 
beginning of the application source code and could be declared in a global header file.
Our point to support this design philosophy is that, if a developer has to introduce 
so many patches to his or her own application, which may impact the consistency of 
the activation tree, a full re-design could be less error prone, than an aggressive 
reshaping.
For the sake of clarity, as we refer to "the application", we intend the whole set of 
processes and threads, which compose a distributed application specifically assuming 
that different fault tolerance strategies may be associated to distinct processing sets. 
The above assumption allows the dynamic reconfiguration of a distributed 
application by swamping down and restarting parts that cannot be removed at the 
same time. The latter requirement is typical in enviroments performing safety- 
critical tasks, where a remote unit, which usually drives a shuttle system, collects 
data to be subsequently validated at a control site [VOAS98a].
Under the above consideration, we designed a hierarchical voting architecture, that 
matches the relation process-thread and allows the dynamic reconfiguration by a 
distributed topology of centralized voting collectors, which perform group-voting 
operations [AGRA911.
In this section we present our extension to Chameleon interface API, which is 
composed of an external pre-compiled library linked to the target application and of 
some ARM OR elements, which act as front-end to the environment.
In the following figure 1.1 we introduce the objects that concur to realize, inside 
Chameleon, the client application front-end: we use the convention to represent 
element objects by square boxes and A R M O R  objects by rectangles. An element is an 
object resilient in its ARMOR (Adaptive Reconfigurable and Mobible Objects for 
Reliability), which provides the execution thread, the message dispatching service 
and manages all the elements allocated in its name space. An istance is represented 
by a single line sketch, where a double line indicates a class object, which admits 
multiple instances of the same type. With the above conventions, the elements of 
figure 1.1 are dynamically allocated in the armor_exec_t name space, which is a class 
ARMOR, whose instance statically lives in the environment initialization code; the
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dotted objects have been specifically developed to design the voting subsystem. The 
elements at the top realize the application front-end by subscribing to a set of 
messages dedicated to manage die data flow coming or going through the 
application interface: each stub implements a peer-to-peer connection with the 
corresponding function API designed for handling the specific flow; the stubs are 
instantiated under request of the managements units (_ m g m t ), which supervise the 
estabilished links and hand over the control to the specific stub under request of the 
application interface. Each element will be described in more detail at the end of this 
section.
np_stub
std_in
voter Jstub
voter._|stub
voter_stub
diagnostic_socket
app_voter_mgmt
fan_out socket_stub
std_out
voter_coordinator
app_io_mgmt app_progress_detect
armor_exec_t
aPP-Progress_mgmt
app_param
app_spawn
app_np_detect
app_np_mgmt
Figure 1.1: armor_exec_t population
We originally introduced the concept of signed flow to manage the data exchanged 
at various levels of the above interface.
If we look at the end-user application as a black box, we can identify a certain number 
of data flows coming from the external world inside the application by mean of 
standard pipes, operating system messages, etc. and a certain number of data crossing 
the application boundaries to reach the operating system.
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A  conventional operating system with no fault tolerant polices would treat all the 
incoming and outgoing flows as raw data, because there is no knowledge at that 
level of any internal representation and thus each request of service merely 
dispatches the information to the parties devices; this situation is depicted in figure 
1.2 with the black arrows crossing the os boundaries.
Figure 1.2: concept of flow; unsigned and signed flows.
On the other hand, when a fault tolerance layer intercepts the delivered 
information, to match it against different replicas of a voting topology, in order to 
assure the correcteness of the "driving" results, it could be very useful to select 
different types of data, which rise up from the application front-end: this is the 
purpose of the multiple stub elements introduced in figure 1.1.
Some flows may be subject to different voting polices, some other of exclusive 
pertinence of the operating system layer, some inter-process communication, some 
diagnostic flows, which we like to be forwarded to the fault tolerance layer to keep it 
informed of the "application health", the remaining ones just for stilistic purposes 
and carring no critical information: all this information is sometimes packed in a 
single transmission unit, expecially when the original application has been designed 
with no fault tolerance strategies in mind.
To properly dispatch the information supplied from the client application, our 
interface provides an adaptation layer and the mechanism of signed flows to deliver 
typified information across the fault tolerant layer boundaries; it is responsibility of 
the application developer to instruct the environment of the different kind of data 
to be exchanged with the external world: the association is performed via a
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declaration block, which has to be called at the very beginning of the application and 
is compliant to ANSI C (figure 1.3).
// This handler initializes the io interface and has to be called at the very beginning 
// of the application
chm_define_interface(chmio, stdin, stdout, stdoutC'VOTE'), socketC'vot2’), \
vgrepC ’ s tilt’ , ”( .  * X \ t \ t * X . , " \2", ’vot2’) ) ;
Figure 1.3: an example of interface definition
The above statement initializes the mandatory fault tolerance control flow (chm io ) 
and defines three types of exchanged data: a standard stream pipe, a socket stream 
and a virtual flow ; each flow is "signed" to identify it from other flows of the same 
type.
The introduced syntaxt resembles the standard C files descriptors with the semantic 
extension to mark each flow  by a four char signature; example: stdout('S iGN ').
Note that, while this syntaxt is actually resembling the C files conventions, a flow  
descriptor is valid only in the context of the Chameleon API and is not replaceable 
outside these bounds, because it uses a fully different mechanism to expand the 
namespace [K.OEN89].
The ability to split uniquely defined flows in different signed types is accomplished 
by the way of virtual flows, barely a set of filter functions, which perform a re­
routing to a list of pre-defined ending points on the basis of unix regular expressions. 
While different kind of virtual flows may be supplied as part of standard Chameleon 
API, the application developer has still the ability to write his/her own interface 
wrappers and to link them to the interface library.
The abstraction of virtual flows has been introduced to allow an easily port under 
Chameleon of existing applications, that may require various voting topologies: 
avirtual flow  abstracts critical information, even if originally delivered over a single 
channel and splits it to different receiving parties (namely stubs), which can be 
dynamically configurated.
The folloving listing (figure 1.4) is an example of how an application can benefit of 
such interface layer.
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// Example of a telecom application: we would like to select 
// the destination field for delivering it to a voting flow
fprintf(stream, "DEST: %d SOURCE: %d PAYLOAD: %s CRC: %d ACCOUNTING: %d",\ 
dst,src,data,crc(data),acct);
// Could be rearranged in:
// At the very beginning:
chm_define_interface(chmio, stdin, stdout, stream('VOTE'), streamC PASS'), \
vgrepCstuf', "(.*)(\t\t*)(. *) " >"\1", 'VOTE', 'PASS'));
// End replacing each occorrence of the above fprintf with:
chm_fprintf(vgrep('stuff'),"DEST: %d SOURCE: %d PAYLOAD: %s" \
CRC: %d ACCOUNTING: %d",dst,src,data,crc(data),acct);
Figure 1.4: a telco interface
Please, note that where the example above refers to a simple stream flow realized by 
the way of the library function print/, the concept of virtual flow may be used to 
implement more complex substitutions: in a very complex protocol, the virtual 
"wrapper" could be a filter written in the Abstract Syntax Notation (ASN .l) [CASN1] 
to address the problem of extracting critical information from existing protocols. 
Moreover, virtual flows may be used to act as software wrappers [VOAS98b], in 
order to reduce the I/O sets to an external program.
While it can be a concern, if the filtering process has to run in the application thread 
or as a separate process on the fault tolerant layer, actually we want to emphasize 
that the signed flows give the ability to summarize in a unique point different 
behaviors related to the information delivered or received at the application front 
end.
Another leitmotiv, which has driven our approach, is the consideration that the 
application interface is a way to provide extra synchronization points to the end-user 
application, because all the communication to and from the fault tolerance layer 
should be handled by blocking calls: a developer may submit the execution of the 
application threads to the results of a certain voting policy; this aspect will be 
discussed further in the following section 2.
As complement to the io interface file, we plan to use a preprocessor program to 
automatize the port of existing code, as the supplied interface will be enough mature 
and proofed to be effective: this tool w ill receive in input the existing unpatched 
source code and a safety specifications file, which will address the requirements for
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the fault tolerance layer and it will produce an ANSI C program suitable for 
recompilation and for running under Chameleon. This scenario is sketched in 
figure 1.5.
We strongly believe that this ending goal can be achieved effortlessly, because we 
have designed the io interface as much simple, semantically speaking and close to 
the standard C interface, so a one-pass lexical analyser shall fulfill the job.
A t the actual design stage the application delivers its flows by the way of proprietary 
functions, which resemble the standard file operators, or the standard notation used 
in other communication handlers: this behavior is realized via a set of macro 
dispatchers, which maps standard C library functions to preassigned flows and hydes 
at the same time any other flow  not specifically declared in the initialization section. 
The library interface will be provided with a public signature to assure the 
compatibility by matching it with the environment core object code.
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The listing below illustrates the replacement rules that act at preprocessing time:
1// Examples of std flow function replacements
|// ORIGINAL SOURCE
|printf("Hello World"); 
IsprintfCfileout, "SOME STUFF");
|// REPLACEMENT RULES
Ichar stuff[4] = 'STUF'; 
¡char vote[4] = 'mark';
Ichm.fprintfÇstdoutC'FLOW'), "Hello Flow");
| chm_fprintfCstdout(stuf), "Hello stuff SELECT marker"); 
|chm_fprintf(vgrepCstuf, "MARK EXPRESSION", vote);
Figure 1.6: example of function replacements
for every virtual flow  we have defined in the above interface, there is a specific built- 
in element in Chameleon, that is responsible for the delivery of information and 
synchronization with other objects: each interface function uses a named pipe to 
communicate w ith the ARMORs and from there the proprietary message pump.
The io elements are part of a dynamic load library, which is handled by a local 
manager (app_io_m gm t), whose responsibility after the initial allocation is to 
supervise the behavior of the io subsystem; it also de-allocates unused elements or 
dynamically reconfigurâtes the system, if required by the selected fault tolerance 
policy.
To efficiently perform the allocation and subsequent addressing of the interface 
stubs, that are instantiated at run-time, we have extended the original message 
pump allowing the registration of dynamic messages; this extension is explained 
briefly in the ending section of the present paper.
The following list is a description of the various elements internal to the ARMOR 
architecture, which compose the io interface: for each element is given a brief 
description of the functionalities along with the message subscription list.
app_io_m gm t : this element instantiated in the arm or_exec_t name space is 
responsible for the initialization and supervision of Chameleon-application io 
subsystem. Because there is an interface stub for each registered application flow, the 
purpose of this manager is to allocate and properly connect the various stubs to the 
application interface; such "connection" is peformed via a dynamic message path: as 
well as this object receives a MSG_REGISTER_FLOW_(TYPE) message, it allocates
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the stub matching the request type, then it contracts a new dynamic message for the 
instantiated element. The new message is registered as private dynamic and notified 
to the interface function for subsequent delivery of the defined flow.
The app_io jm g m t  element subscribes to the following message types:
MSG_APP_IO_INIT
MSG_APP_SIGNATURE
MSG_REGISTER_IO_GROUP
MSG_UNREGISTER_IO_GROUP
MSG_ENABLE_FLOW
MSG_DISABLE_FLOW
MSG_SUBMIT_FLOW
MSG_UN SUBMIT_FLOW
MSGJFORWARDJFLOW
MSG_CREATE_LOCK
MSG_REGISTER_FLOW_STDIN
MSG_REGISTER_FLOW_STDOUT
MS G_REGISTER_FLOW_PIPE
MSG_REGISTER_FLOW_SOCKET
MSG_REGISTER_FLOW_MPI
MSG_REGISTER_VIRTUAL_FLOW
MSG_REGISTER_USER_FLOW
Figure 1.7: app_io_m gm t message subscription list
std_in_stub : as allocated, this element registers a dynamic message 
(D YN A _R EC EIVE_FLO W ) to communicate with its end party, which handles the 
chm_stdin flow; it subscribes also to the following messages:
• DYNAJRECEIVEJFLOW • (MSG_LOCK) I
* MSG_CREATE_LOCK_____________________ * MSG_SIGNAL_RECEIVE_______________|
Figure 1.8: std_in_stub message subscription list
note that the M SG _LO CK  message is subscribed conditionally, if a
M SG_CREATE_LOCK  is received.
std_out_stub : element responsible for delivering the standard output flow, which 
is wrapped by the interface function chm_stdout{); it subscribes to messages:
• D YN A_TRAN SMIT_FLOW • (MSGJLOCK)----------------------------------
• MSG_CREATE_LOCK__________________ * MSGJSIGNALJRECEIVE
Figure 1.9: std_out_stub message subscription list
The dynamic message D Y N A _T R A N S M IT _F L O W  is defined as the element is 
allocated.
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np_stub : creates a named pipe to communicate with the end-user application; the 
named pipe flow is reached by the chm J p r in tf (  chm_np (),. . . ) wrapper. The
subscribed message list is:
• DYNA TRANSMIT FLOW
• MSG CONNECT FLOW
• MSG DISCONNECT FLOW
• MSG CREATE LOCK
• (MSG LOCK)
• MSG SIGNAL RECEIVE
Figure 1.10: np_stub message subscription list
where D YN A _X X X  are dynamic messages contracted as the element is allocated.
socketjstub : intercepts a socket data flow and forwards it to the final destination; 
the subscribed message list is:
• DYNA TRANSMIT FLOW
• DYNA RECEIVE FLOW
• MSG CONNECT FLOW
• MSG DISCONNECT FLOW
• MSG BIND FLOW
• MSG CREATE LOCK
• (MSG LOCK)
• MSG SIGNAL RECEIVE
Figure 1.11: socket_stub message subscription list
m pijs tub  : intercepts any mpi call and delivers it to the appropriate group; the 
subscribed message list is:
• DYNA TRANSMIT FLOW
• DYNA RECEIVE FLOW
• MSG CONNECT FLOW
• MSG DISCONNECT FLOW 
TO BE COMPLETED
• MSG BIND FLOW
• MSG CREATE LOCK
• (MSG LOCK)
• MSG SIGNAL RECEIVE
Figure 1.12: m pijstub  message subscription list
vgrep_stub : this is an example of virtual flow: actually it relies on the unix grep 
command to perform the intended task; soon will be delivered a fully internal 
version of the stub. Additional virtual flows w ill be implemented later.
The vgrep_stub subscribes to the following messages:
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DYNA_TRANSMIT_FLOW
DYNA_RECEIVE_ELOW
MSG_CONNECT_FLOW
MSG_DEFINE_VFLOW
MSG_NEGATE_VFLOW
MSG_TEST_VFLOW
Figure 1.13: vgrep_stub message subscription list
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2 - Smart Voting Topology In this section we present the smart voting system, which 
poses on the previously described interface; we designed it having in mind three 
main concerns [Xu, 1998 #236]:
• dynamic reconfigurability, i.e. the ability to change the voting topology during 
the application life, for example switching from a TM R execution to a DUP mode; 
such reconfigurability, also requires that different application processes can be 
managed separately, i.e. a recovery of an application process does not necessary 
involve the restart of the remaining parts, which appear to work properly.
• total reusability of the voting elements to provide a redundant execution of the 
ARMORS objects inside Chameleon: each ARM OR may be instantiated as logical 
redundant object; the logical ARMOR still resembles the behavior of the basic 
building armor, but it provides extra reliability, because each output message is 
the result of a matched voting agreement among different replicas of the same 
base object (figure 2.1);
Figure 2.1: physical vs logical armor
• manageability at the application front-end: more than a requirement, this is an 
assumption, which states the total responsibility for instructing Chameleon of a 
requested voting policy at total charge of the end user developer. We strongly 
believe that while the fault tolerance layer is the supplier of services, that could 
make an application dependable over a computer network, the end-user 
developer has to set the timing requirements and to choose the right policy 
(among a library supplied by the environment), that best fits his/her own 
application.
The configuration of the fault tolerant layer is accomplished via the io interface file 
introduced in the previous section with a semantic extension, the safety block, 
which allows the client application to contract the required fault tolerance policy: the 
configuration statements take place at the very beginning of the application in a
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mandatory sequence of ANSI C functions, we called Chameleon Interface Block and 
Chameleon Safety Block. The introduction of such interface wrapper will be 
performed automatically in some future: as we explained in figure 1.5, a one pass 
compiler w ill parse the application source code and a specification header (consisting 
of the above two blocks) and it w ill return a patched code, suitable for recompilation 
under an ANSI compliant compiler.
To clarify how a general application written with no fault tolerance polices in mind 
could be patched to run under Chameleon with a preassigned voting topology, we 
will refer to a pseudo-code (figure 2.2) that performs some calculations and gives 
some output results, which we w ill consider our driving results, i.e. the information 
to be validated before delivering it to the intended destination.
For our example, we assume to request:
• a TM R validation on all driving results;
• an intermediate checking point (TMR) on internal state data;
• a synchronization point, where the application thread waits 
for the delivery of some remotely validated information, 
before performing any local voting operation on internal sets.
Please, note that the last requirement is a very handy way to lock the execution of a 
thread waiting for delivery of remote data produced and validated by some other 
actor, thing necessary, if no previous synchronization scheme was built in the 
application; this is a common assumption, if the application has not been specifically 
built for a redundant execution.
// Voting sample
// This pseudo code show the interaction points of a generic appl and how 
// the patching is performed to run it under chameleon with a voting scheme.
main(int arc, char *argv[])
{
printf("Hello APPL starts here \n");
// Appl initialization stuff
// Read input parameters
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
{
______ // Get arq i________
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char * x = argv[i];
// Perform calculations
//Output intermediate result
printf("Status of elaboration cycle %d reading %f\n", i, status);
//Contact another party 
putc(msg, socket_file);
// Collect result from a remote party 
getc(result, socket_in);
// Other processing
// Add local result to a file 
fprintf(fileout, result);
} // END loop
}
Figure 2.2: a generic program eligible for voting
The diagram in figure 2.3 translates the above listing in terms of control flow among 
the io interface points: from such activation graph, we can argument that a generic 
application performs the io operations at scattered intervals, which are function of 
hardware performance and input data; some io calls may result in a blocking thread, 
some other not, depending on the nature of io operation and of the underlying 
operating system software / hardware architectures.
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— ► ©  prin tffHello  APPL starts here \n");
— ► © )  char * x = argv[i];
— ► ©  prin tffS tatus of elaboration cycle %d reading %f\n", i, status);
— ► ©  putc(msg, socke tjile );
--------------------x_ \ — ► ©  9etc(result, socketJn);
^ — ^ ( § )  fPrintf(fileout, result);
Figure 2.3: original source code control flow
Before the introduction of the voting layer, Chameleon was used to replicate the 
program execution simply by issuing the same control flow multiple times: this 
raw control scheme cannot be used in a voting redundant execution, because data 
coming from different instances of the same execution thread need to reach the 
voting periphery at the same time. In order to provide the extra synchronization 
points required by a voting thread and to keep the interface simple, we have choosen 
to implement the semaphores inside the interface wrappers: in this way, the 
original user source code gains a certain number of synchronization placeholders 
uniformely distributed and sematically joined to the voting flows.
In the safety block interface, the end-user developer instructs the environment of 
which flows are critical and which ones require special handling attributes to 
perform synchronization: Chameleon configures the interface stubs for a flow with 
the critical qualifier to collect the data associated with that flow across different 
replicas taking care of the necessary synchronization; an additional "submit" 
attribute may lock the execution every time the flow is referenced waiting for the 
synchronization flows specified in the submit list.
This methodology gives the ability to perform very complex synchronization 
schemes, without strongly impacting the original application source code.
An example of the safety block interface is given in the following listing (figure 2.4), 
which is the result of the above extensions to the previously presented pseudo-code.
// Voting sample
// This pseudo code show the interaction points of a generic appls and how 
// the patching is performed to run it under chameleon 
// HERE PATCHING IS DONE SUPPOSING WE REQUEST A TMR EXECUTION
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main(int arc, char *argv[]
{
// BEGIN of Chameleon INTERFACE
chm_define_interfaceCchmio, stdin, sdtout, stdout('VOTE'), \
socket('rmin'), socket('rout'), file, voter);
// BEGIN of Chameleon SAFETY BLOCK
// Instruct the environment of which redundacy is required for 
// each appl process; a missing specification will result in a 
// single application run.
chm_run_processCmain, TMR);
// [optional]: one per each thread/process supervised: 
chm_hearth_beat_rateC"15 sec", main);
// Specify which flows has to been marked as "critical", i.e. 
// a voter stub is allocated for such critical flows
chm_define_criticalCchmio, stdoutC'VOTE'), socketC'rmin'),
socketC'rmout'), file, voter);
// Voting is performed on the basis of the source flow 
// redundancy, if not otherwise specified; as a voting 
// operation occurs, the flow will be cleared to reach 
// the intending destination, if no submitions has been 
// previously registered in the following section.
// A voter flow performs by default a voting operation 
// with the above policy and synchronizes the execution 
// as the voter has reached an agreement. The synchro- 
// nization happens on a total agreement, if not other- 
// wise specified. Partial agreement require a time-out 
// parameter to specify when a partial agreement can be 
// taken in account, if no total agreement is reached. 
// Example:
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
chm_define_policy(voter, "2/3"); // Unlocks as soon as
// 2 flows agree.
chm_define_policyCvoter, "3/3"); // error if not matchs
// execution.
chm_define_policyCvoter, "5"); // 5/Cflow redundancy)
chm_define_policyCvoter, "2/3", "5 sec");
// The above statement means: 2/3 agreement unlocks 
// as well as timeout is reached, or as soon as a 
// a total agreement is reached. Timeout units may 
// be expressed in terms of absolute time, or relative 
// to samples times Ccollected from the voter).________
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chm_submit_critical("2/2 BEFORE", socketCrout’), \
voter, stdout('VOTE’));
// Flow socketC’rout1) is submitted to the successful agreement 
// (based on respective registered agreement policy) to flows 
// voter and stdout(’VOTE’) . The flow locks BEFORE 
// performing any operation on the "submitted" flow, until an 
// agreement on both the flows "2/2" is reached.
// This function introduced here, just for example, is very 
// useful to synchronize different application processes or threads.
// One or more per critical flow:
// format string syntaxt: "check-rate UNIT [time-out(min, MAX) UNIT]" 
// suffix "ALL" marks every-flow with the same timing specs; any 
// further declaration will produce a run-time error.
chm_check_rate("15 sec", ALL);
// END of Chameleon SAFETY BLOCK
if !Cchm_app_signature('TEST’))
{
// END of Chameleon INTERFACE
chm_printf("Hello APPL starts here \n"); 
// Appl initialization stuff
// Read input parameters 
for (i = 1; i < chm_argc; i++)
{
// Get arg i
char * x = chm_argv[i];
/ / A  bare voting flow: if an agreement is reached it goes on 
chm_fprintf(voter, x);
// Perform calculations
//Output intermediate result 
chrrufprintfCtdoutCVOTE'), \
"Status of elaboration cycle % d reading %f\n", i, status);
// The programs waits on the above statement until all the replicas 
// have reached an agreement, beacuse stdout('VOTE’) has been 
// marked as "critical flow".
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//Contact another party 
chm_putc(msg, socket_file);
// if socket_file is a critical flow, it waits until agreement
// Collect result from end party 
chm_getc(result, socket_in);
// Waits before calling chm_getc until both the submitted flow 
// have reached an agreement. Actually they are part of the same 
// execution thread, so agreement is achieved, if the control 
// flow reaches this point. The function performs the same 
// voting operation, if the flow has been registered as critical.
// Other processing
// Add local result to a file 
chm_fprintfCfileout, result);
} // END loop
} // Chamemeon Safe Execution block if !(chm_app_signatureO)
Figure 2.4: the example pseudocode patched to run under Chameleon
In the beginning of the main application process all the io flow are declared, even if 
not dealing with the voting subsystem; the safety block, which follows the interface 
configuration section, contains hadlers to instruct the environment of the fault 
tolerance requirements for the reliable execution of end-user code.
The first call specifies how many replicas to run for each application process: the 
function chm_run_process() accepts a function pointer and a policy label; in this 
way the application developer may request different redundancies for different 
application processes or threads. The execution redundancy also affects the default 
voting redundacy, if no other behavior is specified.
The hearthJo eat _r at e() takes a format parameter, which can have different tags for 
specifing an hearth beat rate, i.e. a timed check performed on the function code 
given as second parameter.
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All the flows intended for voting, must be marked as critical: for this purpose, the 
function chm _define_critical() uses the same syntax of chm _define_interface(); in 
order to be marked as "critical" a flow has to be previously registered via the 
chm_define_interface() with the only exception of a voter flow, which by default 
ends into a voting device.
The chm_subm.it_critica l() wrapper connects a critical flow to any previously 
defined flow, in a way that stops the thread execution until the submitted flows 
become available; a critical flow becomes "available" as well as a voter has reached 
an agreement (partial or total) upon it. The first parameter of chmjsubmit _ c r itica l() 
interface is a format string, which gives the ability to specify the synchronization 
policy, i.e. if a flow is preposted or deferred to the submitted list; another optional 
parameter is the number of flows, which unlock the semaphore, as they result 
available: a total agreement is the default. Using this function a developer may 
realize very complex voting and synchronization polices just slightly modifing an 
existing application.
If no chm _check_rate() is called on the registered flows, the default check-rate w ill 
be automatically defined at run-time by Chameleon, with a safety margin to prevent 
a too fitted grid; the first parameter is a format string, other acceptable parameters are 
the registered flows, or the label ALL, which applies the issued timings to all the 
previously registered flows. The check-rate parameter is explained in detail later: it 
represents the amout of time that occurs between two subsequent inquiries from the 
central voting collector.
In our example, function chm_app_signature() closes the interface block: this 
function will delivery a signature to the voting subsystem; the central voting 
collector employs such signature to validate data samples delivered from the voting 
periphery. To generate the signatures we can define a one-way function, for example 
a polinomial used in Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), which can be effortlessly 
inplemented in hardware and w ill be subject of a further report.
A ll the interface functions have strict requirements upon the accetable parameter list 
and previous mandatory calls: each time an interface function is called, it checks for 
the consistency of the whole interface context and if something is missing, or wrong 
it returns a non null value. This diagnostic feature gives the ability to perform a 
check on the last interface call to prevent the execution of the application, if 
something went wrong in the interface definition sequence.
Table 2.5 summarizes the requirements for every interface function.
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Interface function Mandatory Defaults Parameters Requirements
chm _define_interface yes chm io m andatory , 
then  v.a.
no n e
chm _run_process n o  if  s ing le  
execution
thread ptr, po licy p rev  defined 
function  thread
chm _hearth_beat_rate fo rm at string , th read  
p tr
p rev  defined 
function  thread
chm _defm e_critical fo r  v o ting chm io m andatory , 
then  v.a.
can reference ony 
p rev  reg istered  flow s 
an d  vo te r flow s.
chm _define_policy flow , fo rm at string, 
opt fo rm at string
on ly  prev  reg istered  
critical flow s
chm _subm it_critical fo rm at s tring , flow , 
v .a .
firs t flow  critica l, 
o ther reg istered  
flow s
chm _check_rate fo rm at s tring , flow , 
ALL
reg is te red  flow s
chm _app_signature yes
fo r v o ting
signature string
Table 2.5: Chameleon Interface requirements
To synchronize all the independent voting threads with the user-application under 
the specified fault tolerance policy, we have chosen to collect the application io flows 
at specific time intervals; such sample interval is passed to Chameleon in the safety 
block interface, via the chm _check_ratef) function call.
Figure 2.6 shows the interaction path between the end-user application and the fault 
tolerance environment: the control flow on the end-user side is subject to some 
synchronization points, which match the io interface placeholders for the registered 
voting flows.
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Figure 2.6: IO and control flow
The abstraction layer supplies a continous flow to the interface stubs, as well as the 
voter stubs: as a voting operation is performed, the output drives the 
synchronization lock and goes through the output channel (if any has been 
registered as end party of that flow). The real synchronization is performed at specific 
sample intervals on the Chameleon io interface layer, which is the central collector 
of all the incoming flows (synchronization and dispatching). The synchronization 
intervals are under control of the user application, which instructs the environment 
of the bounds and of slacks in which each window can grow or stretch.
Such synchronization scheme came us in mind to prevent a deadlock condition and 
by argumenting that if some data cannot be collected upon a certain time for 
subsequent voting, we would like to reach a partial agreement or a disagreament, if 
there are no enough data for voting, which would trigger some recovery operation; 
this aspects is peculiar of software fault tolerance, which in case of an exception need 
to perform some recovery tasks asynchroneously, where an hardware solution 
usually would raise an error signal to bring the system in a fail-safe condition.
W ith the above intending, the fault tolerance environment is under total control of 
the application interface and it is developer’s responsability to issue the 
dependability requirements to the platform: he or she really knows, which are the 
critical timings and when is best to give-up, then wait indefinitively.
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In the following figure 2.7 we introduce the smart voting topology outlining the 
exchanged data flow between the client application and the Chamelon architecture: 
the example refers to a choosen TMR topology, where three replicas of the same 
application process are matched to produce a voted driving output at the 
environment front-end; although the diagram refers to a specific fault tolerance 
setting, it can be easily extended to different voting polices, mixted as well. Each 
arrow represents a vector data flow produced at a certain end and delivered to the 
corresponding party; in figure we distinguish the following kind of objects:
Physical elements, appearing as square boxes represent a single object instance and
make integrant part of the voting system.
Logical elements are single functional units, however their functionalities result 
from a collection of objects, which handle separately different messages, upon a 
shared architecture; logical elements are marked as a continuos circle.
A  group is a compount of many elements (logical and physical) intended to fulfill a 
specific job; as groups, we have the io subsystem, which has been explained in the 
first section of this report and the voter subsystem, whose composition will be given 
later.
The same conventions introduced for the elements apply to the groups: a physical 
group , marked as a continous line, lives on a sigle node of the chameleon 
architecture.
A  virtual group collects similar functionalities and gives the abstraction of the 
globally exchanged flows.
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Figure 2.7 Chameleon voter control flows
To understand the role of the various objects, which concur to realize the voting 
topology presented here, we can follow the data flow  of figure 2.7 from the top left to 
the top right.
As the input data originating at the client application reaches the Chameleon front- 
end, it encounters first the 10 subsystem; where it is dispatched to the object fan_out, 
whose responsibility is to provide the different application replicas with the same 
driving input; the fan_out element is equipped with a blocking mechanism, which 
prevents the delivery of further data, if the subsequent blocks of the voting chain 
have not performed the evaluation of previous data chunck.
The io_switch appearing in the 10 subsystem group has the purpose to adapt the 
driving flow  to the required voting parallelism, according to the commands received
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from the central voter ARMOR (right). We introduced this closed control loop, 
because the number of voting parties may change during the application life, due to 
a specific request to switch the redundancy level, or as conseguence of a permanent 
failure in the voting chain. Such failure may result from an hardware problem at 
the application node, where the program is actually running, if no spare nodes are 
available for resuming the execution of the missing replica; alternatively, a 
permanent failure may occur, when different versions of the same application 
running in multiple mode bring to mismatching results, because of an error in the 
control flow  of one of them.
The output of the application replicas passes through the 10 subsystem (centre), 
which acts, as explained in the first section of this paper, as intermediate collector of 
voting data: the flows markedcritical are separated from other registered data flow 
and redirected to the voting subsystem. There are to distinct data paths, one for the 
external output, namely drive data , one for thevoting data.; both use semaphores to 
assure the proper timing to the end parties.
As the application replicas do not drive straightly the operating system devices, but 
the output goes through the io_subsystem, which acts as intermediate collector of 
voting data, and voting data are delivered through different channels by the 
io_subsystem.
The paths
Voting data are delivered to the voter ARMOR, as well as it has fullfilled the 
previous voting cycle and as the incoming channels are marked "active" (an 
incoming flow may become "unavailable", if the associated replica has signaled 
REPLICA_MAX_FAILURES times a voting mismatch under a TMR or more 
redundant topology); this parameter prevents the rejection of a voting flow, due to 
temporany jamming on its associated channel.
The driving output is selected on the basis of the voting agreement polices and in 
any case after the voting cycle has been completed reaching an agreement, although 
partial; a partial agreement does not affect the driving output, but the abnormal 
situation is signaled to the fault tolerance manager (FTM). It is the io_switch in the 
(central) IO subsystem, that controls the delivery of driving outputs to the external 
environment.
The voter subsystem collects data asynchronously from the application replicas and 
synchronizes the entire environment: as a new voting cycle is fulfilled at the voter 
end, a message unlocks the io switches and the subsequent data chunk is delivered; 
after that, a signal notifies to the sentinel element the successful completion of the 
voting cycle. The sentinel element acts as a monitoring process of the voter health 
and implements some recovery polices: if an internal watchdog reaches zero, an 
inquiry to the FTM checks for a possible deadkock condition; upon a certain time
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from the first signal another watchdog resets the voting system under the 
assumption that it hung for some reason.
In the above discussion we analyzed the data-flow of the voting subsystem; in. the 
remaining part we will focus on the interaction among the different elements, 
which compose the voting subsystem, as shown in figure 2.8:
The figure 2.8 refers to an application running over Chameleon composed of two 
processes, the first process shares two application threads and the second one three;
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moreover, the first process has required a duplicated mode execution, while the 
second group uses a triple module redundancy (TMR). Please, observe that the 
creation of two separate voting groups is the conseguence of two different voting 
topologies requested for the application processes: whenever both processes should 
be subject to the same voting topology, they can coexist in the same voting group.
As the io interface stubs are responsible for capturing the application data flow and 
delivering it across Chameleon, the voter_stub elements collect the information 
marked as critical for subsequent dispatching: the flows are transferred to a voter 
coordinator, which is a local collector of the information coming asynchronously 
from the application interface; the coordinator acts as rate adapter between the 
incoming flow  and the samples delivered at a fixed check-rate upon request from the 
central manager.
There is a coordinator per replica and different application threads may share the 
same voter coordinator. To provide the ability of handling separately different part 
of the application, we have introduced the concept of voting group : a voting group is 
a set of monitored user application threads, which can be subject to the same voting 
and recovery policy!
The example presented in figure 2.8 shows two process of the same user application: 
the first process owns two threads, which produce two voting flows registered to a 
coordinator as "group 1"; there are two coordinators associated to voting "group 1", 
because the first process instance is replicated in duplicated mode. The second 
process, which executes in TMR, has three threads and produces three voting flows 
(one per thread) registered as "group 2" to the local cordinator.
Please, note that the concept of voting flow is independent from the location of the 
source data: more execution threads of the same process may register different flows, 
just because the requirements in terms of redundacy are different.
The voter coordinators deliver the collected information to a central element, which 
periodically triggers this end parties for a new data sample.
Before delivering the voting information, the coordinator objects perform one 
important operation intended to keep small the voting overhead: they assemble the 
data collected from the voter_stubs, assign them an unique sequence number and 
generate on the whole data chunk a digital signature, which is delivered to the 
central voter in place of original data (figure 2.9). In this way, the voter element has 
to compare small signatures, instead of the complete data set from which come 
from. Different flows share the same signature, if belonging to the same voting 
group, because the delivered information triggers the same recovery operation, in 
case of a continous disagreement at the voter end.
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Figure 2.9: voting flow and signatures
Figure 2.9 explains the mechanism, of signature generation referring to the first 
process of figure 2.8, which is replicated two times.
The voter executes its voting thread cycle, performs the required semaphore update 
depending on the voting policy, notifies the fault tolerance manager of partial 
agreements and requests the next voting sample from the periphery.
As for the io subsystem, we give the list of the voting elements and their message 
subscription list:
voter_stub : is the sofware probe, which collects data sent from the application and 
forwards it to the voter co o rd in a to r  object. Actually a stub simply aliases the 
messages supplied from an io subsystem stub and performs the job subscribing to the 
following messages:
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• MSG_ADD_VOTER_ELEMENT • DYNAJTRANSMITJFLOW
« MSG__REMO VE_V OTER_ELEMENT * DYNA_RECEIVE_FLOW
Figure 2.10: voter_stub message subscription list
fa n_ou t : this element simply forwards a single input flow to multiple application 
io_stubs, in order to drive the various replicas of a redundant execution with the 
same input source; the element is coordinated by the central voter element, which 
sets and resets an internal semaphore to provide synchronization with the matched 
execution step. It subscribes to the following messages:
~  MSG_REGISTER_V OTER_GROUP ~  DYNA_TRANSMIT_FLOW
• MSG_UNREGISTER_V OTER_GROUP • DYNA_RECEIVE_FLOW
• MS G_N OTIFY_AGREE • (MSGJLOCK)
• MSG_NOTIFY_PARTIAL_AGREE * MSG_SIGNAL_RECEIVE_______________
Figure 2.11: fan_out message subscription list
a p p _vo te r_m gm t. : is the interface element, which receives the configuration 
messages from the interface API at the very beginning of user application; this 
element builds up the overall voting subsystem allocating the objects to perform the 
requested fault tolerance policy.
• MSG_REGISTER_V OTER_GROUP • MSG_APP_SIGNATURE
• MSG_UNREGISTER_V OTER_GROUP • MSG_CONNECT_VOTER_ELEMENT
• MSG_ADD_VOTER_ELEMENT • MSG_DISCONNECr_VaiER ELEMENTT
• MSG_REMOVE_VOTER_ELEMENT
Figure 2.12: app_voter_m gm t message subscription list
arm or_voter_cfgt : this element is under developement and acts as counterpart of 
the app_voter_m gm t for any voting policy internal to the armor structure. It 
configures the elements required in a voting system internal to the ARMOR and 
instructs each element of the different behavior required in such context.
voter c o o rd in a to r  : a coordinator acts as mediator between the interface stubs and 
the centralized voter; it adapts the application flow rate to the voting check-rate and
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performs the important operation to assemble all the voting data delivered from the 
application stubs in a whole chunk of data, upon which a digital signature is 
generated. The coordinator delivers only the digital signature to the central voter, 
because it reflects the actual output of the whole voting group. Before sending the 
signature the coordinator inserts the time-stamp, which marks the sample in the
continous flow supplied from the application front-end. This element subscribes to 
the follow ing messages:
• MSG_REGISTER_VOTER_GROUP
• MSG_UNREGISTER_VOTER_GROUP
• MSG_ADD_VOTER_ELEMENT
• MSG_REMOVE_VOTER_ELEMENT
• MSG_CONNECT_VOTER_ELEMENT
• MSGJ^ISCCNNBCTJVQIERJELEMENr
MSG_ENABLE_VOTER_GROUP
MSG_DISABLE_VOTER_GROUP
MSG_LOCK_V OTER_GROUP
MSG_UNLOCK_VOTER_GROUP
MSG_GET_SAMPLE
MSG_GET_NEXT_SAMPLE
Figure 2.13 : voter co o rd in a to r  message subscription list
a rm orjvo te r  : is the central object, where actually voting is performed. This 
element handles the voting, coordinates the incoming message queues coming from 
the voting coordinators and broadcasts messages to inform the party elements of the 
result upon complention of voting operation. Here is its message subscription list:
MSG_ENABLE_VOTER
MSG_DISABLE_VOTER
MSG_ARMOR_VOTER
MSG_VOTER_CONNECT
MSG_VOTER_DISCONNECT
MSG_NOTIFY_AGREE 
MS G_N OTIFY_PARTIAL_AGREE 
MSG_NOTIFY_MANAGER 
MS G_V OTER_FAILURE 
MSG_VOTER_CHANGE MODE
Figure 2.14 : arm orjvo te r  message subscription list
voter_topology  : this element is not yet implemented and w ill allow in future the 
creation of finite state voting automata, which converge to the bounded result. The 
configuration and theory that supports this element w ill be part of a separate paper.
/
/
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3 - Chameleon Messsage Dispatching As in previous sections, we have extended the 
message addressing space alloving the registration of dynamic messages, i.e. of 
messages that are defined at run time in the normal environment operation and 
may be revocated, upon completion of the intended service. Chameleon messages 
are defined as unsigned integer: we have restricted the addressing space to integers 
having the first bit set for dynamic messages.
Adynam ic message, gives the ability to address specific elements, without increasing 
the overhead as the number of subscribing elements grows. This characteristic has 
been felt necessary to implement the io subsytem interface stubs and the voter stubs.
Moreover, the ability to register dynamic messages moves the responsibility of 
addressing from the receiving ends to the sources securing the delivered 
information against errors, which could arise from the same fault tolerance 
environment due to the coupling of elements sharing the same messages.
A  very strong encapsulation of receiving parties is performed by the way of private 
messages, which are delivered only to a restricted group of end parties.
The above functionality is performed in differed ways: marking a message exclusive 
delivers it only to those elements, who previously registered the message; a reserved 
message is intended for the elements of a certain group, while a private message 
specifies in advance the list o f receiving parties.
If an element attempts to subscribe to a message, which is not allowed, it gets an 
error reply.
The functions for handling dynamic messages are Register MessageQ,
InvalidateMessageQ, ReservedMessage{), MessageExclusive{\ DefineGroupQ, whose 
calls are translated in the following list of statically defined messages:
MSG_REGISTER_MESSAGE
MSG_INVALIDATE_MESSAGE
MSG_RESERVED_MESSAGE
MSG_MESSAGE_EXCLUSIVE
MSG_DEFINE_GROUP
to access the functionality from the Chameleon application interface.
The dynamic message dispatching is currently under developement.
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Conclusions
Chameleon framework aim is not to replace conventional fault-tolerance 
techniques, which can be still employed and are sometimes mandatory to assure 
hardware availability [VOAS98b]; the main goal of Chameleon and other similar 
dependable software architectures [CUKI98] is to increase the availability of services 
provided via untrusted networked systems, or using components-off-the-shelf 
(COTS), which most of the times cannot supply the same reliability of custom 
designed mission-critical softwares [IYER99], but are globally available at reasonable 
prices.
With the above intention, we designed some components, which can be easily 
integrated in existing software architectures to increase the reliability o f the whole 
system; such components have been thought to guarantee at a time the availability 
of the basic "dependable" framework, which provides the fault-tolerance services, 
such as the smart voting subsystem.
The introduction of "virtual flows" provides a way to easily collect source data flow 
from existing applications, not specifically designed to be failure-tolerant, in order to 
submit it to the smart-voting system.
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